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PROMOTING WORLD PEACE
THROUGH THE USE OF THE
“GOOD BOOK”: IMPLEMENTING
FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE TAX
CODE
Whosoever saves a single life, it is as if he saved the entire
world.—Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4:5
INTRODUCTION
ince Christopher Columbus’s epic 1492 voyage to the New
World, we have inhabited an economically interdepen-
dent, globalized world. As a result, products we require on a
daily basis often originate as bits and pieces gathered from
countries all over the globe. Therefore, it is no surprise that
raw materials used to manufacture so many mundane products
often stem from third-world countries, worlds away from west-
ern society. These materials and minerals are found in com-
monplace electronic devices that people around the world de-
pend upon in their daily routines; these devices sustain lives,
assist in the performance of business, provide entertainment,
and enhance our days in myriads of ways. However, many
source countries that are blessed with the abundance of re-
sources and minerals that are used in assembling our everyday
electronic devices are all too often cursed with violent conflict
and crushing poverty.
This conundrum is particularly apparent in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (“DRC”). The DRC is renowned for its pleth-
ora of natural resources.1 Therefore, one would assume that the
country would be thriving. However, the converse has ensued:
the people of the DRC are subjected to both unremitting vio-
lence2 and rampant poverty.3 Counterintuitively, the DRC’s
1. Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic
Republic of Congo 1993 To 2003, GLOBAL WITNESS 4 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drc_exploitation_and_hu
man_rights_abuses_93_03_en.pdf [hereinafter Natural Resource Exploita-
tion].
2. Enough Project Team & Grassroots Reconciliation Group, A Compre-
hensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals, ENOUGH PROJECT 1 (Apr.
2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Comprehensive-Approach.pdf [here-
inafter A Comprehensive Approach].
S
954 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
resource abundance seems to exacerbate both the discord and
ensuing atrocities.4
Why should the global community care? After all, this is not a
world problem. Or is it? The current humanitarian crisis in the
DRC is appalling, with thousands dying daily.5 Members of the
international community must be made aware of the tragedy
that is occurring in the DRC and support efforts to end the cri-
sis there. Additionally, virtually all consumers have a direct
hand in the ongoing crisis, as the minerals that are fueling the
conflict6 are regularly found in components of many common-
place products.7 Thus, the situation in the DRC is not a Congo-
lese or African issue, but truly a global issue.
In reality, while millions of innocent lives are being lost in
the DRC,8 the global community often looks the other way.9 Re-
cently, belated efforts both in the United States and across the
globe have been put forth attempting to deal with these is-
3. Rural Poverty in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, RURAL POVERTY
PORTAL, http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/dr_congo# (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014).
4. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2. The DRC is considered “the
world’s least developed country in terms of life expectancy, education, stand-
ard of living and key health indicators.” The IRC in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, INT’L RESCUE COMMITTEE,
http://www.rescue.org/where/democratic_republic_congo (last visited June 9,
2015). The recent violence has led to the deaths of up to six million people,
and even cannibalism has been reported. Owen Jones, Let’s Be Honest. We
Ignore Congo’s Atrocities Because It’s in Africa, GUARDIAN, Mar. 6, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/06/ignore-congo-
atrocities-africa-drc-horror. The violence has left the DRC both impoverished
and devastated. Id.
5. Measuring Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE 2,
http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
file/IRC_DRCMortalityFacts.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter
Measuring Mortality].
6. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2.
7. John Prendergast, Can You Hear Congo Now, ENOUGH PROJECT 2–3
(Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Can%20Your%20Hear%20Congo%20Now.
pdf.
8. Measuring Mortality, supra note 5, at 1.
9. See, e.g., id. at 1; see also JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF
MONSTERS 5 (2011).
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sues.10 Although in the United States there are currently no
bans on using minerals outsourced from the DRC, there is a
statute, with regulations promulgated thereunder, that strive
to implement transparency requirements regarding the use of
minerals originating from the DRC and its surrounding envi-
rons.11 Additionally, around the world, several mechanisms
have been implemented to deal with the DRC minerals, includ-
ing an approach adopted by the United Nations.12
This Note explains why the current U.S. legislation and regu-
lations intending to control the flow of the “Conflict Minerals”13
in the DRC are having the opposite effects of what was intend-
ed by the U.S. Congress in enacting such legislation. It also ex-
amines global steps that have been taken to alleviate this prob-
lem which are triggering a negative outcome as well. The Note
further analyzes constitutional challenges faced by current
U.S. legislation. Finally, the Note will suggest a different ap-
proach to properly regulate the flow of Conflict Minerals.
Part I of this Note briefly outlines the bloodstained history of
the DRC and elaborates on how the “Resource Curse”14 has ex-
acerbated this conflict. Part II examines the history of § 1502 of
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
10. See CONFLICT MINERALS–AN EVALUATION OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND
OTHER RESOURCE-RELATED MEASURES 5–6 (2013),
http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1809/2013-483-en.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATION
OF THEDODD-FRANK ACT].
11. Id. at 1–2; Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
12. Namely, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. EVALUATION
OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT, supra note 10. Other approaches include: the Con-
flict-Free Tin Initiative; the Analytical Fingerprint method; and the Certified
Trading Chains initiative. Id. Additionally, the European Union has recently
begun informal talks with EU-member states to implement a law similar in
scope to Dodd-Frank to regulate Conflict Minerals. Shreema Mehta, EU Votes
for Strong Conflict Minerals Regulation (May 28, 2015),
https://www.earthworksaction.org/earthblog/detail/eu_votes_for_strong_confli
ct_minerals_regulation.
13. “The term conflict mineral means (A) columbite-tantalite (coltan), cas-
siterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its
derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.” Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2218.
14. See RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL
ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS 1 (1993).
956 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
Act (“§ 1502”)15 and its implementing regulations promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). It also
provides a critique of § 1502 and addresses recent litigation re-
garding the constitutionality of § 1502. Part III discusses in-
ternational efforts to control the flow of Conflict Minerals, spe-
cifically the United Nations’ approach. This Note concludes
with Part IV, which evaluates current approaches and suggests
an ideal method of dealing with Conflict Minerals, thereby re-
ducing violence and saving lives.
I. THE “RESOURCE CURSE” AND ITS IMPACT ON THEDRC
A. Defining The “Resource Curse”
Regions that have an abundance of natural resources often
suffer from poverty, a concept commonly known as the “Re-
source Curse.” The Resource Curse conundrum is a major issue
that challenges current economic scholarship.16 The hypothesis
suggests that there is an inverse association between a coun-
try’s economic growth and its endowment with natural re-
sources.17 Under this thesis, countries blessed with natural re-
sources counterintuitively lag in economic growth behind coun-
tries without them.18 This phenomenon remains a troubling
problem facing developing countries, but its cause puzzles
scholars and researchers.19
Several theories have been advanced to explain the Resource
Curse paradox. Early theories explaining this inverse relation-
ship were grounded in economic causes. For example, some
scholars hypothesized that the Resource Curse was a result of
commodity-price volatility, asserting that the overdependence
on a single-export commodity could expose a developing econo-
15. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502,
124 Stat. at 2218.
16. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abun-
dance and Economic Growth 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 5398, 1995), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398.
17. In the fountainhead study on the Resource Curse phenomenon, econo-
mists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner found that economies with a high
proportion of natural resource exports to GDP had lower growth rates during
the following years than did other countries with comparable economies. Id.
at 1.
18. AUTY, supra note 14.
19. Sachs & Warner, supra note 16.
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my to macroeconomic shocks if world prices would shift.20 Oth-
ers proposed a theory known as “Dutch Disease,” the concept
that a resource boom is bad for other nonbooming sectors, in
order to explain this enigmatic occurrence.21 On the other
hand, different researchers attempted to explain this phenom-
enon based on social causes. These researchers argue that peo-
ple become lazy when resources are abundant.22 Conversely,
countries lacking abundant natural resources invest in their
human resources; i.e. training and education.23
However, more recently scholars have advanced a novel ex-
planation for the Resource Curse. Empirical studies were con-
ducted on poorer nations that possessed oil and mineral
wealth.24 These studies revealed that the resource rich coun-
tries not only grow slower than resource-poor counter parts and
were more likely to suffer from civil wars, but that the oil and
mineral wealth by themselves stifled democracy in such coun-
tries.25 Therefore, recent research emphasizes the negative im-
pact of countries possessing significant amounts of natural re-
sources, not just on a country’s wealth, but also on the institu-
tions and mechanisms of the government’s accountability to its
20. Paul Collier, Primary Commodity Dependence and Africa’s Future,
WORLD BANK 2–3, 9 (Apr. 2012),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-
1251813753820/6415739-1251814045642/Collier-full.pdf.
21. W. M. Corden & J. P. Neary, Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation
in a Small Open Economy, 92 ECON. J. 825, 841 (1982).
22. See Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51
WORLD POL. 297, 309 (1999). The societal based theory is based upon the
premise that laziness is associated with an abundance of natural resources.
Id. Thus, when resources are plentiful, society lacks a strong motivational
drive toward economic development. Id.
23. Dani Rodrik, The Past Present and Future of Economic Growth 4 (Glob.
Citizen Found., Working Paper No. 1, 2013). For example, the so-called Four
Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) lack indige-
nous natural resources but have invested in human capital and have seen
dynamic economic growth during the twentieth-century. Jamil Nasir, The
Making of an Asian Tiger, NEWS (Jul. 27, 2013),
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-192677-The-making-of-an-Asian-
tiger; but cf. Jean-Philippe Stijns, Natural Resource Abundance and Human
Capital Accumulation, 34 WORLD DEV. 1060 (2006) (asserting that countries
with abundant natural resources do invest in human capital and education).
24. Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 325
(2001).
25. Id. at 328.
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citizens.26 This line of theories posits that the Resource Curse
is an economic problem triggered by the intricate relationship
between numerous political and institutional failures.27
B. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Many resource-rich African countries appear to be affected by
the Resource Curse. In these situations, the Resource Curse
can often be traced to corruption and violence. In Africa, for ex-
ample, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, the Re-
public of Congo and Equatorial Guinea were the top eight oil
producers in 2011.28 Yet in the last decade, violent conflict or
authoritarian governments have plagued all of these coun-
tries.29
The DRC in particular, suffers acutely from the Resource
Curse. Located in the heart of Africa, it is the world’s eleventh
largest country by area30 and has a substantial supply of natu-
ral resources.31 Its vast natural resources and mineral wealth
make it possibly the richest country in the world, with total
mineral wealth estimated to be $24 trillion USD, equal to the
Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) of the United States and Eu-
rope combined.32
Specifically, the DRC has an abundant supply of Conflict
Minerals, which is used to produce the metals tin, tantalum,
and tungsten, in addition to gold (referred to as “3TG Miner-
26. See, e.g., Alastair Smith, The Perils of Unearned Income, 70 J. POL. 780,
790 (2008).
27. See id.; see also Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A
Survey 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15836, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836.pdf?new_window=1.
28. Terra Lawson-Remer & Joshua Greenstein, Beating the Resource
Curse in Africa: A Global Effort, GOOD GOVERNANCE AFR. (August 1, 2012),
http://gga.org/stories/editions/aif-3-africas-natural-resources-if-we-are-so-
rich-why-are-we-so-poor/beating-the-resource-curse-in-africa-a-global-effort.
29. Id.
30. The World Factbook, CENTR. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html?countryname=Congo,%20Democratic%20
Republic%20of%20the&countrycode=cg&regionCode=afr&rank=11#cg (last
visited Dec. 31, 2014).
31. Natural Resource Exploitation, supra note 1.
32. M. J. Morgan, DR Congo’s $24 Trillion Fortune, AFR. BUS., Feb. 2009,
at 52.
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als”).33 For example, the DRC is the sixth largest manufacturer
of tin, making an estimated 6 to 8 percent of the world’s sup-
ply.34 Similarly, the DRC produces about 20 percent of the
worldwide production of tantalum.35 Although, the DRC only
produces a small portion of the global supply of tungsten and
gold, the mining of these minerals is still very profitable and
also aggravates violence there.36
Yet, although it has such a vast abundance of resources, the
DRC is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world.37
The DRC had a GDP per capita income of only $400 USD in
201338 and less than 30 percent of its rural population had ac-
cess to an improved water source.39 Furthermore, the DRC fac-
es brutal carnage and suffers from decades of conflict; perhaps
the world’s deadliest since World War II.40 Every day, more
than a thousand innocent men, women, and children are killed
or die of starvation.41 Since 1998, more than five million people
have died; at times, forty-five thousand have perished each
month, about half of them young children.42 The vast majority
of people are dying from preventable and treatable indirect
conditions such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malnu-
33. Conflict Minerals, ENOUGH PROJECT,
http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict-minerals (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
[hereinafter Conflict Minerals].
34. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2, at 2.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 15. For example, although the DRC produces only about 1 per-
cent of the world’s gold supply, id., it still earns armed groups up to $88 mil-
lion USD annually. Prendergast, supra note 7, at 3.
37. The Democratic Republic of Congo ECHO Factsheet, EUR. COMM’N 2
(Sept. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/drc_en.pdf.
The DRC was ranked second to last in the world in the 2014 Human Devel-
opment Index and is one of the poorest countries in the world despite having
abundant natural resources. Id.
38. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html (last
visited Dec. 31, 2014).
39. Data, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SAFE.RU.ZS/countries/CD?displ
ay=graph (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
40. Conflict in Congo Deadliest Since World War II, Says The IRC, INT’L
RESCUE COMMITTEE, http://www.rescue.org/news/conflict-congo-deadliest-
world-war-ii-says-irc-3730 (last updated Jun. 22, 2014).
41. Measuring Mortality, supra note 5.
42. Jones, supra note 4.
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trition.43 Furthermore, the DRC remains “the most dangerous
place in the world to be [female],”44 with “the prevalence and
intensity of sexual violence against women in eastern Congo”
considered “almost unimaginable.”45 Tragically, on average for-
ty-eight women were raped an hour in 2011.46
The unremitting violence and the ensuing humanitarian cri-
sis in the DRC are prime examples of the Resource Curse in
action. Not only has resource abundance not improved life in
the DRC, it is actually the root cause of much of the mis-
ery.47 The trade in Conflict Minerals is one of the key drivers of
the ongoing cycle of discord and violence in the DRC.48 Fur-
thermore, institutional and political failures, namely corrup-
tion, are at the core of this calamity as every year armed
groups, often with governmental ties,49 earn hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars by dealing in Conflict Minerals.50
Violence in the DRC is driven by militias and armies fighting
to obtain power through control over mines that produce Con-
flict Minerals.51 Armed groups from the DRC and surrounding
countries support themselves through illegitimate trade in
Conflict Minerals.52 Therefore, it is no surprise that a majority
of the conflict occurs in the central mining areas of North and
43. Id.
44. Prendergast, supra note 7, at 1.
45. Stephanie McCrummen, Prevalence of Rape in E. Congo Described as
Worst in World, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801194.html. Margot Wallstrom, a
senior U.N. official, has called the DRC “the rape capital of the world” with
more than eight thousand women raped during fighting in 2009. UN Official
Calls DR Congo ‘Rape Capital of the World’, BBC (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8650112.stm.
46. Jones, supra note 4.
47. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2.
48. Id.
49. DR Congo: End Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/02/19/dr-congo-end-
illegal-exploitation-natural-resources.
50. Conflict Minerals, supra note 33. See also Corruption Perceptions Index
2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (rank-
ing DRC 154th out of one hundred seventy-four countries in corruption).
51. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2, at 1.
52. Id. at 4.
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South Kivu in the DRC.53 The mining of Conflict Minerals is
not limited to the acts of rebel groups; soldiers from the Congo-
lese National Army, and even their commanders, are also in-
volved in the mining.54
While pilfering these minerals, rebel groups, as well as the
Congolese army, have used forced labor, often in harsh and
hazardous conditions and have levied illegal “taxes” on the citi-
zen population.55 Profits earned by armed groups from the
trade of Conflict Minerals were estimated to be in the hundreds
of millions of dollars in 2008 alone.56 Additionally, rebels have
employed violence against innocent civilians who attempt to
refuse to work for them or in order to compel civilians to sur-
render the minerals they extract.57
Many people are entirely oblivious to the fact that Conflict
Minerals can be found in most, if not all of their electronic de-
vices.58 In fact, if a product has a circuit board, it most likely
contains Conflict Minerals that originated in the DRC. For ex-
ample, tantalum, which is extracted from coltan, a mineral
found in major quantities in the DRC, is an important element
in creating devices that hold electricity and is commonly found
in products such as cell phones, hearing aids, air bags, jet en-
gines, and rockets.59 Rebels sell the processed coltan to multi-
national corporations such as Sony, Nokia, and IBM.60 Fur-
53. Id. at 2.
54. Faced With a Gun What Can You Do?, GLOBAL WITNESS 5 (July 2009),
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/report_en_final_0.pdf
[hereinafter Faced With a Gun].
55. Id.
56. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2, at 3.
57. Faced With a Gun, supra note 54.
58. Id. The media coverage also has not adequately portrayed the ongoing
atrocities in the DRC. STEARNS, supra note 9, at 5. Even the New York
Times––one of the few American papers with extensive coverage on the Afri-
can conflicts ––gave Darfur four times the coverage it gave Congo in 2006,
despite that the rate of war-related Congolese deaths was nearly ten times
the rate in Darfur and up to six million deaths have been recorded since 1998
as a result of the Congolese government’s failure to meaningfully control or
govern its territory. Id.
59. Coltan Facts, FRIENDS OF THE CONGO,
http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/coltan_facts.pdf (last visited Dec. 29,
2014) [hereinafter Coltan Facts] (Coltan is short for columbite-tantalite. Id.
When refined, coltan becomes metallic tantalum. A Comprehensive Approach,
supra note 2, at 3).
60. Coltan Facts, supra note 59.
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thermore, tin that originates in the DRC is used as a solder on
circuit boards,61 while tungsten is used to make cellphones vi-
brate.62 Finally, gold extracted in the DRC is regularly used in
the production of electronics and, of course, is a popular com-
ponent in jewelry.63
C. DRC Conflict History
Conflict has been part of the DRC’s character in various
forms for generations. Although battles over resources have not
always been the sole point of contention, they have contributed
to the hostility and continue to do so.64 The bloody history of
the DRC dates back to 1885, when King Leopold II of Belgium
claimed the Congo as his “personal fiefdom.”65 He made a for-
tune exploiting the Congo’s rubber supplies during the “rubber
boom.”66 Leopold set up a system of slave labor where his sadis-
tic subordinates killed or maimed hundreds of thousands, while
millions of others died from starvation or from disease.67 It is
estimated that half the population of the Congo was wiped out
at that time.68 Soon thereafter, King Leopold was pressured by
international human-rights activists to relinquish his ruthless
reign, and he handed the country over to Belgium.69 Although
the Belgians established a more elaborate government, they too
focused on mineral extraction and not on Congolese develop-
ment.70 In 1960, Belgian colonial rule finally ended after a suc-
61. Prendergast, supra note 7, at 2.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
64. A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 2, at 1.
65. Anup Shah, The Democratic Republic of Congo, GLOBAL ISSUES,
http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/87 (last updated Aug. 21, 2010). Le-
opold established the Congo Free State, his own private enterprise, turning
the local inhabitants into slaves to harvest rubber and ivory for his personal
benefit. ADAMHOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’SGHOST 159–61 (1998).
66. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 65.
67. Shah, supra note 65. It was the official policy to cut off hands to en-
force the rubber quota. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 65, at 165.
68. Id. at 233. According to these estimates, the population dropped by
about ten million people during the Leopold period and its immediate after-
math. Id.
69. STEARNS, supra note 9, at 8.
70. Id.
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cessful nationwide independence movement.71 However, chaos
quickly returned in a period known as the Congo Crisis.72 In
1971, Joseph Mobutu, a former sergeant in Belgium’s colonial
army, commenced ruling the country, changing its name to
Zaire.73 Mobutu was initially a popular leader, fostering na-
tional unity and culture.74 Eventually, Mobutu became increas-
ingly paranoid and distrustful of the government and army and
ultimately cannibalized his own institutions and infrastruc-
tures.75
Since decolonization and independence, the Congo has expe-
rienced a series of political calamities that in 1996 led to the
start of what is known as the First Congo War.76 The reasons
for the war were multifaceted, but they were partially based on
various governments’ interests in overthrowing Mobutu.77 Ul-
timately, the ailing Mobutu was ousted and replaced by Lau-
rent-Desire Kabila, a former rebel leader.78 Kabila subsequent-
ly renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo.79
The Second Congo War broke out in August 1998 for many of
the same reasons as the First Congo War.80 Kabila held the
71. Roots of the Crisis, ENOUGH PROJECT 1,
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/pdf/crisis_roots_congo.pdf (last visited
Mar. 8, 2015).
72. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States, Belgium, and the Congo
Crisis of 1960, 29 REV. POL. 239, 239–41 (1967).
73. STEARNS, supra note 9, at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. EVALUATION OF THE DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 10, at 14. In 1994,
the civil war in neighboring Rwanda escalated and almost one million Hutus
and Tutsis were murdered at the hands of the Hutu militia and army.
STEARNS, supra note 9, at 8. In his bid to become a regional power broker,
Mobutu severely angered neighboring countries by hosting more than ten
different foreign armed groups in his territory. Id. Consequently, in 1996, a
regional coalition led by Angola, Uganda, and Rwanda joined to overthrow
Mobutu. Id.
77. STEARNS, supra note 9, at 8. See EVALUATION OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT,
supra note 10, at 14.
78. Roots of the Crisis, supra note 71, at 2.
79. Congo: Colonial Period to Present, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/congo/timeline.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
80. See Herbert Weiss, The Second Congo War and Its Consequences, AM.
DIPL. (Aug. 2000),
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_16/weiss/weiss_congo4
.html. After the short hiatus, a second insurrection backed by Rwanda and
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presidency until his assassination in January 2001, and his
son, Joseph Kabila, was then declared ruler of the
DRC.81 In 2002, a peace agreement was negotiated with
several rebel groups.82 Nevertheless, violence and ter-
ror continued to dominate the DRC.83 Despite extensive
diplomatic efforts, including a 2009 peace accord,84 the brutal
fighting carries on to this day, with great suffering and the loss
of innocent lives.85 Thus, the hope for permanent peace in the
DRC remains elusive.86
The current crisis in the DRC illustrates and reflects the his-
torical pattern of conflict in the area. As outlined above, Con-
flict Minerals currently play a key role in the ongoing conflict.
In response, mechanisms have been introduced to govern the
flow of Conflict Minerals, both in the United States and abroad.
Uganda challenged the regime, and in August 1998, war broke out again af-
ter President Kabila attempted to gain independence from regional support-
ers and moved to remove Rwandan elements from his government. Roots of
the Crisis, supra note 71, at 2. A ceasefire agreement was signed in Lusaka in
July 1999. Id.
81. Roots of the Crisis, supra note 71.
82. See Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Withdrawal of the
Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and the Dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, July 30, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1053.
83. Id.
84. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT AND LE CONGRES NATIONAL POUR LA DEFENSE DU PEUPLE
(CNDP) (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_090323_Peace%2
0Agreement%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20CNDP.p
df.
85. Measuring Mortality, supra note 5. The United Nations has been pre-
sent in the DRC deploying a twenty-thousand strong peacekeeping force
known as the Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“MONUC”).
Roots of the Crisis, supra note 71. But the bloodshed continues as MONUC
has been unable to contain the violence fomented at the hands of both the
Congolese army and rebel militias. Id.
86. See Congo-Kinshasa: Even Harder Times Ahead for Displaced in DR
Congo, ALL AFR. (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201312041456.html (“[W]ith so many other armed
militias in the eastern DRC, peace remains elusive.”).
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II. THE U.S. APPROACH TO REGULATING CONFLICT
MINERALS
The United States has recently led the way in adopting legis-
lation that attempts to encourage peace in the DRC by regulat-
ing the flow of Conflict Minerals.87 The following section tracks
the legislative history of the law and criticizes the U.S.’s ap-
proach. The section also explains why the adopted legislation
may in fact be exacerbating the situation.
A. The Congo Conflict Minerals Act and § 1502 of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
To “promote peace and security in the DRC,”88 Senator Sam
Brownback introduced the Congo Conflict Minerals Act
(“CCMA”) on April 23, 2009.89 The CCMA was structured as a
securities-based regulatory system for the Con-
flict Minerals trade, which intended to target the trade of Con-
flict Minerals in the DRC.90 Although the CCMA was never
passed in its entirety, many of its key provisions were adopted
as part of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).91 In 2010, Dodd-Frank was
passed “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
87. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
88. S. 891, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009).
89. Id. The Congo conflict has been raised as an issue in the United States
Congress for a number of years. During the 109th Congress, then Senator
Barak Obama, among others, cosponsored S. 2125, the Democratic Republic
of Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006, which
states:
The National Security Strategy of the United States, dated Septem-
ber 17, 2002, concludes that “[i]n Africa, promise and opportunity sit
side-by-side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threat-
ens both a core value of the United States preserving human dignity
and our strategic priority combating global terror. American inter-
ests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction:
we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liber-
ty, peace, and growing prosperity.”
S. 2125 109th Cong. § 101 (2006).
90. S. 891.
91. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502.
966 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.”92
Buried in the voluminous Dodd–Frank is § 1502 entitled,
“Disclosure Relating to Conflict Minerals Originating in the
Democratic Republic the Congo,” which promotes a very differ-
ent goal.93 Unlike other provisions of Dodd-Frank, § 1502 is not
a financial regulation. Rather, it is Congress’s response to the
continuing humanitarian crisis in the DRC and its attempt to
deal “with the exploitation and trade of Conflict Minerals orig-
inating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, [which] is
helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of
violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”94
Section 1502 amended § 13 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 193495 by specifically directing the SEC to promulgate
regulations requiring companies to annually disclose whether
the tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold that such companies use
in the manufacturing of products originated in the DRC or an
adjoining country.96 If a company does in fact manufacture or
contract to manufacture products that are not DRC conflict
free, the disclosing party is further required to submit a Con-
flict Minerals Report to the SEC.97 This report requires de-
scriptions of the steps taken to exercise due diligence on the
source and chain of custody of the minerals. The required steps
include an independent audit of the report, which describes the
facilities used to process the minerals, the minerals’ country of
origin, and the efforts made to determine the mine from which
the minerals came or location of origin.98 In addition to being
required to make these disclosures to the SEC, reporting com-
panies are also required to make this information available to
the public on the reporting company’s website.99
92. Id. pmbl.
93. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502.
94. Id.
95. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(E). The rule does not require that companies
place any type of label or disclosure on products. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56,274, 56,323 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p–1,
249b).
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Important to note is what § 1502 neglects to do. Section 1502
fails to prohibit public companies from using Conflict Minerals
in the manufacture of their products. Instead, it attempts to
curb the exploitation and trade of Conflict Minerals merely
through “name and shame” tactics by requiring companies to
provide disclosures about their use of Conflict Minerals.100 The
U.S. Congress hoped that the reputational damage engendered
by such a disclosure in annual reports would act as a deterrent
to consumers.101
B. Critique of § 1502
Although § 1502 only constitutes a fraction of Dodd-Frank,
its impact is far reaching and a source of contention. During
the rulemaking process, the SEC received more than thirty
thousand comment letters.102 Due to industry pushback against
the proposed regulations mandated by § 1502, the SEC delayed
publishing rules to accompany § 1502 for over a year.103 At long
last, on August 22, 2012, the SEC issued final regulations to
implement § 1502.104
The execution of § 1502 has received a great deal of attention
and criticism.105 First among these criticisms, is that the im-
plementation of § 1502 has resulted in a de facto embargo on
100. See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’S New
Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315,
1344 (2012).
101. Id.
102. FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE MAJORITY COMMITTEE STAFF,
MEMORANDUM ON THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF DODD–FRANK’S
CONFLICT MINERALS PROVISION 2 (May 16, 2013) [hereinafter UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES MEMO],
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/052113_mpt_memo2.pdf.
103. Implementing the Conflict Minerals Provision: The Cost of Business as
Usual, GLOBAL WITNESS (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/The_Cost_of_Business
_as_Usual.pdf.
104. SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484002#.
VL7ihkfF-ZM.
105. See, e.g., Tim Worstall, My Nomination For Worst Law Of The Year:
Dodd Frank On Conflict Minerals, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/12/25/my-nomination-for-worst-
law-of-the-year-dodd-frank-on-conflict-minerals/.
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DRC-sourced minerals.106 Second, it is contended that the SEC
was not the appropriate governing body for the task of regulat-
ing Conflict Minerals.107 Third, recent litigation has presented
U.S. constitutional challenges to § 1502.108 Finally, the legisla-
tion leaves the implementation of U.S. foreign policy in the
hands and whims of corporations and not in the hands of gov-
ernmental authorities.109
1. De Facto Embargo
The foremost criticism of § 1502 is the consequential de facto
embargo on all DRC-sourced minerals.110 Critics point out that
in order to avoid the risk of tainting their reputation by fund-
ing African warlords, many companies withdrew their trade
with the DRC and began purchasing their minerals from other
viable alternatives, even before the law came into effect.111
These companies apparently felt that instead of sifting through
the numerous requirements of the new law, they would seek
readily available alternative sources for their supplies. Addi-
tionally, in September 2010, DRC’s President Kabila estab-
lished a temporary ban on all mining in the Kivu and Maniema
provinces.112 Although the specific reason for the ban is uncer-
tain, what does seem certain is that President Kabila would not
have instituted the ban if § 1502 had not been implemented.113
106. See infra Part II.B.1
107. See infra Part II.B.2
108. See infra Part II.B.3.
109. See infra Part II.B.4.
110. Laura E. Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Miner-
als, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advo-
cacy (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 284),
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425843.
111. Id. See also Michael J. Kavanagh, Congo Tin Sales Tumble 90 Percent
as Companies Avoid Conflict Minerals, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-23/congo-tin-sales-tumble-90-
percent-as-companies-avoid-conflict-minerals-.html.
112. DR Congo Bans Mining in Eastern Provinces, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11269360.
113. Laura Seay lays out several theories explaining why President Kabila
instituted the ban. See Seay, supra note 110. Two of the theories are prem-
ised on the fact that President Kabila acted in response to the impending
implementation of § 1502. Id. The first theory argues that the reason for the
ban was to undermine the success of § 1502. Id. The second theory argues
that the reason for the ban was to give Kabila’s troops an opportunity to mili-
tarize previously nonmilitarized mines before § 1502 went into effect. Id.
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The de facto embargo of trade with the DRC has had devas-
tating economic consequences on an already impoverished and
conflict-torn country.114 In fact, in many ways the legislation is
having the opposite effect than the law intended by further im-
poverishing the people of the DRC. This de facto embargo has
unsurprisingly led to the halting of legitimate mining produc-
tion,115 and, in turn, has caused mass unemployment.116 There
have been reports of children being forced to drop out of school
because their parents could not afford to pay their minimal tui-
tion, and other tales of mothers giving birth at home because
they could not afford the meager $20 USD fee for a maternity
clinic.117 Furthermore, the de facto embargo may actually be
aggravating the violence by fostering an increase in the illegal
and fraudulent trade of Conflict Minerals.118 Finally, unem-
ployed miners have been forced to join armed groups out of
desperation.119 Thus, it is apparent that the law is having the
reverse effect in the DRC than was intended. Ironically, the
more the law achieves its ultimate goal, the more this calami-
tous situation holds true.
2. SEC as Regulator
Section 1502 requires the SEC, the agency normally charged
with policing America’s financial markets, to issue regulations
requiring firms using Conflict Minerals to investigate and dis-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Sudarsan Raghavan, How a Well-Intentioned U.S. Law Left Congolese
Miners Jobless, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/how-a-well-intentioned-us-law-
left-congolese-miners-jobless/2014/11/30/14b5924e-69d3-11e4-9fb4-
a622dae742a2_story.html.
117. David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/opinion/how-congress-devastated-
congo.html?_r=0.
118. EVALUATION OF THEDODD-FRANK ACT, supra note 10, at 4.
119. Heather Murdock, New Law Aims to Halt Sale of Conflict Minerals
from Congo, VOICE AM. (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/content/new-
law-aims-to-halt-sale-of-conflict-minerals-from-congo—
120079359/157912.html. John Kanyoni, president of North Kivu Exporters
Association, says that hundreds of thousands of people are now out of work,
and continued unemployment will only further drive the conflict. Id. He fur-
ther states, “Their mission of fighting against the violation of human rights
will be putting people in situation [sic] where they will be jobless. And most
probably those who will be jobless could join the armed groups.” Id.
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close the origin of those minerals. The SEC’s stated mission is
“to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient mar-
kets, and facilitate capital formation.”120 However, in contrast
to other provisions of Dodd-Frank and acts generally falling
under the purview of the SEC, § 1502 is not a financial regula-
tion. Despite this precedent, the SEC was nevertheless charged
with the daunting task of regulating Conflict Minerals, a task
seemingly out of the agency’s normal line of duty.
Furthermore, the SEC is not readily qualified to carry out
implementation of the law.121 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
testified before Congress that “it was unusual for the SEC to
promulgate and enforce regulations under prescriptive laws
that require specialized knowledge of the mineral trade in the
DRC.”122 Moreover, the SEC lacks both the expertise and fund-
ing to conduct studies on the impact of § 1502 on the Congolese
and U.S. Businesses.123 Consequently, the SEC has made vital
decisions without proper assessments.124 Accordingly, it is ap-
parent that the SEC is likely the wrong vehicle to implement
any significant change in human rights violations in the DRC
as it is simply out of the agency’s scope and mandate.125
3. Constitutional Challenge to §1502
As previously illustrated, the SEC’s final rule promulgating
§ 1502 has been controversial. It is estimated that the effects of
§ 1502 are far reaching, in that it impacts at least six thousand
of all publicly traded companies in the United States,126 while
120. How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Fa-
cilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated June 10, 2013).
121. The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-Frank’s Conflict Minerals Pro-
vision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Pol’y and Trade, 113th
Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, visiting Fellow, Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace).
122. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCESMEMO, supra note 102.
123. The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-Frank’s Conflict Minerals Pro-
vision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Pol’y and Trade, 113th
Cong. 9.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Dodd–Frank Section 1502 and the SEC’s Final Rule, ERNST AND
YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/US/en/Services/Specialty-Services/Climate-
Change-and-Sustainability-Services/Conflict_minerals_Dodd_Frank_Section
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
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having an implementation price tag in the billions of dollars.127
As a result, it is not surprising that there have been numerous
legal challenges contesting various provisions of § 1502.
In National Association of Manufacturers v. S.E.C.,128 the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable chal-
lenged § 1502 on numerous grounds.129 In one if its chief argu-
ments, the plaintiffs contended that § 1502 violated the First
Amendment because it required companies to publish their
Conflict Minerals disclosure on their own websites.130 The
plaintiffs argued that the disclosure requirements improperly
compelled “burdensome and stigmatizing speech” in violation of
the First Amendment.131
Ordinarily, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of re-
view applied to challenges to laws that significantly abridge a
fundamental right such as free speech.132 However, the Su-
preme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
127. The National Association of Manufacturers estimated the costs be-
tween $9 and $16 billion USD, Conflict Minerals, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS,
http://www.nam.org/Issues/Trade/Conflict-Minerals.aspx (last visited Dec. 31,
2013), while the SEC has estimated that compliance would likely initially
cost companies $3 to $4 billion USD, and more than $200 million USD annu-
ally, Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,334 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p–1, 249b).
128. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). The Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
Business Roundtable initially filed their action in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the legality of the Conflict Min-
erals Rule and § 1502. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 53. Since the
D.C. Circuit determined in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, 714 F.3d
1329 (D.C.Cir. 2013), that it did not have initial jurisdiction over a direct
challenge to a different SEC rule issued under Dodd-Frank, id. at 1333, the
plaintiffs moved to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia and the Circuit Court granted that request. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,
956 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
129. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
130. Id. at 73; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(E). Additionally, plaintiffs argued that
§ 1502 was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 54. However, the court held that
§ 1502 did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 56.
131. Id. at 73.
132. Strict Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Under strict
scrutiny, the government must establish that it has a compelling interest
that justifies and necessitates the law in question. Id.
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Service Commission of New York133 applied a test commonly
recognized as intermediate scrutiny to laws restricting com-
mercial speech.134 Additionally, in Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio135 the court held that
compelled disclosures to protect consumers against deception
required only rational basis scrutiny, thus creating another ex-
ception.136 The circuits are split as to the appropriate level of
scrutiny when the Zauderer exception (i.e. compelled disclo-
sures to prevent consumer deception) does not apply. The D.C.
Circuit determined that the Central Hudson intermediate
standard applied if Zauderer did not, even when compelled
speech and not a restriction of speech was at issue.137 In con-
133. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
134. Id. at 566. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must estab-
lish that the law in question substantially advances an important govern-
ment objective. Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). Although the Supreme Court initially held that the First Amendment
did not protect commercial speech, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54
(1942), the Supreme Court granted commercial speech limited protection in
1975, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975). A few years later, the
Central Hudson court articulated a four-pronged test, which has since been
recognized as intermediate scrutiny, to evaluate the constitutionality of gov-
ernment regulation of commercial speech. 447 U.S. at 566. At issue in Central
Hudson was the constitutionality of a New York law that prohibited promo-
tional advertising by utility companies. Id. at 558-60. To pass muster under
the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, the government must estab-
lish that the law in question substantially advances a government interest
and that it is not more extensive than necessary. Id. at 566.
135. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
136. Id. at 651. Under rational basis review, a law will be upheld by a court
so long that it has a reasonable relationship to the attainment of a legitimate
governmental interest. Rational-Basis Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). The Zauderer court was faced with a challenge to the constitution-
ality of the Disciplinary Rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Practice for-
bidding attorney deception in regard to a misleading advertisement. Zauder-
er, 471 U.S. at 636. In Zauderer, the court articulated an exception to the
general First Amendment analysis and instead applied a rational basis
standard. Id. at 651. Under the Zauderer rational basis test, factual and un-
controversial disclosures are permissible if they are “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumer” so long as the re-
quirements are not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.” Id.
137. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205,
1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, the court considered a chal-
lenge to a tobacco labeling requirement. Id. at 1211. The court concluded that
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trast, both the Sixth Circuit138 and the Seventh Circuit139 have
held that the strict scrutiny standard applied rather than the
Central Hudson intermediate standard, if Zauderer did not.
These seemed to hold that Central Hudson only applied to reg-
ulations that restrict commercial speech, not to ones which
compel speech.140
In National Association of Manufacturers, the District Court
held that the constitutionality of §1502 was removed from the
Zauderer rational basis standard.141 The court stated that
the labels were not subject to review under Zauderer, but notably, the court
did not apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 1217. Rather, in the absence of the Zau-
derer exception, the court examined the label requirement using Central
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard and found that the warnings violat-
ed the First Amendment. Id. at 1222.
138. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554
(6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech disclosure requirement fits within
the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a rational-basis
standard. If it does not, then we . . . apply strict scrutiny.”).
139. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevicg, 469 F.3d 641, 651–52 (7th
Cir. 2006) (analyzing whether strict scrutiny or the Zauderer test applies to
compelled commercial speech and not considering whether intermediate scru-
tiny should be applied); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d
43 at 77, n. 26 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Discount Tobacco City). In Discount
Tobacco City, the court also considered a challenge to a tobacco labeling re-
quirement. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 520–22. Notably, instead of apply-
ing the Central Hudson intermediate standard like the District Court, Com-
monwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (W.D. Ky.
2010), the Sixth Circuit applied the Zauderer rational basis test. Disc. Tobac-
co City, 674 F.3d at 561. The court then determined that the government sat-
isfied the rational basis burden. Id. at 569. Discount Tobacco City demon-
strates that strict scrutiny applies when commercial speech disclosure re-
quirements do not fit within the Zauderer framework. Id. at 554.
140. Commentators have articulated that the reason the circuits are in dis-
agreement is because “The [Supreme] Court has not specified how broadly
Central Hudson applies. It is unclear whether it applies only to the situation
addressed in Central Hudson—where a law restricts speech—or whether it is
a default framework for commercial speech that applies generally, save rare
instances.” Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech
Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y&L. 205, 218 (2011).
141. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 77 (D.D.C. 2013). The
question remained, however, which standard to apply: plaintiffs’ counsel ar-
gued that either the strict scrutiny standard applied or, alternatively, the
regulation at least survived intermediate scrutiny. Id. Although the SEC
urged the court to apply the rational basis standard articulated in Zauderer,
the court noted that the SEC’s counsel had already conceded that the § 1502
disclosures did not aim to prevent misleading or deceptive speech. Id. The
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although other courts, namely the Sixth Circuit142 and the Sev-
enth Circuit,143 apply strict scrutiny when a case falls outside
the Zauderer exception, the D.C. District has “rejected this di-
chotomous approach,”144 and instead in “evaluating the consti-
tutionality of compelled commercial speech, any ‘burdens im-
posed . . . receive a lower level of scrutiny from courts.’” 145 The
District Court stated that after finding Zauderer inapplicable,
they were bound to apply the Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny standard.146
Based on the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny analysis,
the District Court held that the Conflict Minerals disclosure
requirement was constitutional.147 Therefore, in July 2013, the
court upheld the Conflict Minerals Rule in full and rejected the
industry groups’ argument that § 1502 violated companies’
First Amendment rights.148
The District Court’s decision was immediately appealed to
the D.C. Circuit.149 On April 14, 2014, a divided D.C. Circuit
Court held that the SEC’s rule violated the First Amendment
“to the extent the statute and rule require regulated entities to
report to the SEC and to state on their website that any of
their products have ‘not been found to be DRC conflict free.’”150
More specifically, the court held that the final rule failed the
third prong of the Central Hudson test, which requires that the
government show that the restriction is “narrowly tailored.”151
The court stated that the SEC failed to explain why the alter-
District Court therefore held that the SEC’s concession rendered Zauderer
rational basis review inapplicable. Id.
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
145. Id. (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d
1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). After finding Zauderer inapplicable, the D.C.
Circuit applied the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard. Id.
146. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
147. Id. at 82.
148. Id.
149. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
150. Id. at 373 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In so concluding, the Court of Appeals specifically noted that there was no
“First Amendment objection to any other aspect of the conflict minerals re-
port or required disclosures.” Id. at 370 n.8.
151. Id. at 373.
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natives to regulating speech that were suggested by the plain-
tiffs would be less effective.152
In a startling development in July of 2014, the D.C. Circuit in
American Meat Institute v. USDA,153 an en banc D.C. Circuit
overruled the National Association of Manufacturers Circuit
Decision to the extent that the court held that the Zauderer ex-
152. Id. As an alternative to the SEC’s rule requiring companies to describe
their products as “conflict free,” the plaintiff suggested that either companies
could use their own language to describe their products or the government
could create a list of products it believes are affiliated with the Congo War.
Id. at 372. In its analysis, however, the court did not decide whether to apply
strict scrutiny or the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test since the
Conflict Minerals disclosure requirement did not even survive the Central
Hudson intermediate standard. Id. The court simultaneously with its issu-
ance of this decision, ordered the Clerk to “withhold issuance of the mandate
herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing
or petition for rehearing en banc.” Order Withholding Issuance of Mandate at
1, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5252),
available at
http://www.srz.com/files/upload/Conflict_Minerals_Resource_Center/Order_to
_Withhold_Issuance_of_the_Man date.pdf. On May 29, 2014, the SEC filed a
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc pending the decision in American
Meat, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The SEC explained its reasoning
for its request as follows:
As both the majority and concurring opinions recognized, however,
shortly before the panel opinion in this case was issued, the Court
granted en banc rehearing in American Meat Institute v. United
States Department of Agriculture, No. 13-5281, to consider whether
rational basis review can apply to compelled disclosures even if they
serve interests other than preventing deception. Argument was held
in that case on May 19. Because the en banc court’s decision in
American Meat Institute may affect the important constitutional
questions addressed by the panels First Amendment ruling in this
case, we respectfully request that the court hold this case for poten-
tial panel rehearing or rehearing en banc once that decision is is-
sued.
Petition of the Securities and Exchange Commission for Rehearing or Re-
hearing En Banc Pending the Decision in American Meat Institute v. USDA
at 1–2, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 2014)
(No. 13-5252).
153. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In American
Meat, the D.C. Circuit found that U.S.D.A. regulations mandating detailed
country of origin labeling for meat products were constitutional, id. at 27, and
held that the Zauderer rational basis test applied to compelled disclosure
requirements, even when such requirements do not target consumer decep-
tion as in Zauderer, id. at 22.
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ception could not apply to purely factual disclosures imposed
for reasons other than consumer deception.154 In American
Meat, a case involving the constitutionality of United States
Department of Agriculture (“U.S.D.A.”) regulations requiring
country of origin labeling for meat products, based on First155
and Second156 Circuit precedent, the court held that the Zau-
derer exception swept more broadly than the interest of reme-
dying deception alone.157 Therefore, the court declared that the
Zauderer rational basis standard of review could be applied to
purely factual disclosure requirements—even when the gov-
ernment’s interest for imposing such disclosures are for rea-
sons other than the prevention of consumer deception.158
Based on this holding, the court granted a rehearing of the
National Association of Manufacturers decision by the original
appellate panel to determine if the framework set out in Ameri-
can Meat would affect the Conflict Minerals disclosure re-
quirement.159 Specifically, the court ordered the parties to
submit briefs illustrating how the American Meat holding
would impact the constitutionality of the Conflict Minerals dis-
closure regulation, and what was meant by “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” as used in Zauderer.160 Seeming-
ly, if it were determined by the appellate panel that the infor-
mation required to be disclosed pursuant to §1502 were “purely
factual and uncontroversial,” the Zauderer rational basis re-
view standard would apply to the Conflict Mineral disclosure
regulation, unlike what the court originally determined.
154. Id.
155. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir.
2005) (Torruella, J.).
156. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133
(2d Cir. 2009).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21753
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014). In the November 2014 order that was issued with
the order granting the panel rehearing, the Circuit Court deferred the previ-
ously filed petition that sought rehearing en banc. Order Withholding Issu-
ance of Mandate at 1, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (No. 13-5252), available at
http://www.srz.com/files/upload/Conflict_Minerals_Resource_Center/Order_to
_Withhold_Issuance_of_the_Mandate.pdf.
160. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 21 (2014) (citing Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)).
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On August 18, 2015, in a strongly worded split decision, the
same three judge Circuit Court panel reaffirmed its April 2014
decision and rejected the SEC’s argument that the Zauderer
rational basis review standard applied.161 The court held that
§ 1502’s requirement to describe products as having “not been
found to be ‘DRC conflict-free’” is compelled speech that vio-
lates the First Amendment.162 The court concluded: “Requiring
a company to publicly condemn itself is undoubtedly a more
‘effective’ way for the government to stigmatize and shape be-
havior than for the government to have to convey its views it-
self, but that makes the requirement more constitutionally of-
fensive, not less so.”163 However, the court left open the ability
for the SEC to petition the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en banc
of the August 18 decision.164 On October 2, 2015, the SEC did
in fact petition the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en banc.165
161. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14455, at *14 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). It is important to note that the court only struck down §
1502’s mandatory disclosure requirement. The remainder of § 1502’s provi-
sions were unaffected and remain good law. Thus, the SEC’s order, issued
after the 2014 D.C. Circuit Court decision staying the effective date of com-
pliance for the challenged portions of the rule, currently remains in effect.
Order Issuing Stay, In the Matter of Exchange Act Rule 13p-1 and Form SD,
SEC Release No. 72079 (May 2, 2014). However, the core elements of the
rule, such as the reporting requirements and supply chain due diligence,
must nevertheless be complied with. Id.
162. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14455, at *33. The majority
added a new ground for its decision: even under a more deferential standard,
the government’s interest in lessening the conflict in the DRC was not ad-
vanced by the rules. Id. at *15–16.
163. Id. at *32–33.
164. The D.C. Circuit Court in an order issued simultaneously with the Au-
gust 18, 2015 ruling, ordered that the petitions filed in November of 2014 be
dismissed as moot, but the court ordered a new period for petitioning for an
en banc review to run from the entry of the judgment accompanying the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers opinion filed on August 18, 2015. Order,
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2015) (No. 13-
5252).
165. Petition of the Securities and Exchange Commission for Rehearing En
Banc, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 2015) (No.
13-5252). If the D.C. Circuit agrees to rehear the case en banc it would likely
take the court at least another twelve months to issue a decision. See Barbra
A. Jones, Uncertainty Continues for the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Reporting
Regime After D.C. Circuit Confirms First Amendment Violation (Aug. 28,
2015), http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-
401-
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Based on the D.C. Circuit Court’s holding that § 1502 is at
least partially unconstitutional and the circuit split in regard
to the proper standard to apply to non-deceptive compelled
commercial speech,166 the viability of the disclosure provisions
of § 1502 is still an issue very much in doubt167 and thus is ripe
for Supreme Court intervention.
4. United States’ Foreign Policy Objectives of Stopping World
Terror and Promoting Human Dignity Should Not Be Deter-
mined by the Whims of Corporations
Section 1502 states that in enacting this legislation, Congress
intended to end the violence in the DRC, which is financed in
large part by the exploitation and trade of Conflict Minerals.168
28012/pdfCopy.name=/Uncertainty%20Continues%20for%20SEC's%20Conflic
t%20Minerals%20Reporting%20Regime.pdf.
166. See Jones, supra note 165. Some other circuits do not seem to follow
the expansive approach adopted by the D.C. Circuit in American Meat (as
well as the First Circuit in Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294,
310 (1st Cir. 2005) and the Second Circuit in N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.
City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009)). See, e.g., Int’l Dairy
Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Zauderer exception narrowly applies to inherently or potentially misleading
speech and not mandatory factual disclosures). Therefore, they would likely
hold that the low-bar test set out in Zauderer does not apply to Conflict Min-
erals since it is uncontested that consumer deception is not an issue in the
required Conflict Mineral disclosures. This difference in views would likely
result in a circuit split if that the D.C. Circuit were to adopt the expansive
approach of American Meat in regard to Conflict Minerals in a rehearing of
the case en banc. Furthermore, in the absence of the Zauderer exception, oth-
er circuits, namely the Sixth and Seventh Circuit, see supra notes 138 and
139 and accompanying text, would likely default to the strict scrutiny test,
and would not utilize the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny exception as
the District Court did in National Association of Manufacturers. Based on
these premises, it would be a herculean task for a court of appeals other than
the D.C. Circuit (or perhaps the First or Second Circuits) to rule that § 1502
does not violate the First Amendment right to free speech, specifically when
using the strict scrutiny lens likely advocated by the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuit.
167. First, since the circuits are split on the interpretation of Zauderer and
its progeny, if the D.C. Circuit were to rehear the case en banc or if the con-
stitutionality of § 1502’s disclosure requirements were heard by a different
circuit, such court may reach a very different conclusion and uphold the dis-
closure requirements’ constitutionality. See Jones, supra note 165. Second, it
remains unclear whether the flaw in the disclosure provision was a result of
the language of § 1502 or of the SEC’s rule. Id.
168. Dodd-Frank § 1502(a) provides as follows:
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Similarly, the legislative history in previously proposed stat-
utes dealing with Conflict Minerals, makes clear that Con-
gress’s intent in adopting § 1502 was to both further America’s
interest in stopping global terror and to promote its core value
of preserving human dignity.169 The “name and shame” mecha-
nism employed by § 1502, however, leaves the implementation
of American foreign policy to the caprice of corporations. Ergo,
if a corporation finds it profitable to purchase Conflict Minerals
and does not mind being stigmatized, it can continue to openly
purchase Conflict Minerals from the DRC with no repercus-
sions, so long as it reports such purchases to the SEC and lists
them on the company website. What follows is that United
States’ foreign-policy goals of stopping world terror and pro-
moting human dignity in the DRC are subject to the whims of
corporations.
Juxtapose the current implementation of American foreign
policy regarding a nuclear-armed Iran: In 2010, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and
Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISAD”)170 which extended the Amer-
ican economic sanctions on Iran in order to pressure Iran to
end its nuclear weapons program. The statute provides a clear
directive prohibiting American companies from conducting cer-
tain enumerated transactions with Iran.171 Under the CISAD,
the embargo of Iran is not a matter of choice that could be
freely ignored, but rather is a clear mandate from Congress.172
Similarly, the proper way to implement the United States’ core
foreign policy of ending terror and promoting human rights in
the DRC is by directly enacting legislation to prohibit trade in
Conflict Minerals.
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo particularly sexual-
and gender- based violence, and contributing to an emergency hu-
manitarian situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13
(p) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsec-
tion (b).
169. See supra notes 87 and 88 and accompanying texts.
170. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act,
Pub. L. 111–195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010).
171. See id. § 103.
172. Id.
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III. GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICTMINERAL
CRISIS
A. Due Diligence Guidance
In addition to the approach adopted by the United States un-
der § 1502, there have been several other initiatives presented
to regulate the flow of Conflict Minerals.173 In 2004, the United
Nations Security Council appointed a group of experts (“Group
of Experts”) to issue reports to the United Nations concerning
various issues relating to the DRC.174 In November of 2010, the
Group of Experts issued guidelines as to how importers, pro-
cessing industries, and consumers of DRC mineral products are
to exercise due diligence and not purchase Conflict Minerals.175
The U.N. Security Council consequently adopted Resolution
1952 in support of these recommendations.176 In order to im-
plement Resolution 1952, the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (“OECD”)177 published the Due Dili-
gence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“Guidance”).178
The Guidance “provides detailed recommendations to help
companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to con-
flict through their mineral purchasing decisions and practic-
es”179 and is to be utilized by any company potentially sourcing
minerals or metals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.180
It is considered one of the only international frameworks of-
173. EVALUATION OF THEDODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 10.
174. Established by S.C. Res. 1533, ¶ 10 (Mar. 12, 2004).
175. S.C. Res. 596, (IX), ¶¶ 356–69 (Nov. 29, 2010).
176. S.C. Res. 1952, ¶ 7 (Nov. 29, 2010).
177. Founded in 1960, the OECD is a thirty-four-country international eco-
nomic organization that aims to stimulate economic progress and world
trade. Members and Partners, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
178. OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY
CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS (2d ed.
2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf [hereinafter
OECDDUEDILIGENCEGUIDANCE].
179. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: OECD Due Diligence Guid-
ance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2015).
180. Id.
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fered to aid companies to comply with their due diligence re-
porting requirements.181
The OECD five-step approach includes the following steps:
step one calls for the strengthening of due diligence skills, in-
ternal systems, and record keeping;182 step two asks for the un-
dertaking of a risk assessment of mines, transportation routes,
points where minerals are traded, and suppliers;183 step three
calls on downstream companies to evaluate and respond to
risks in order to prevent or mitigate adverse effects;184 step four
calls for participation in audit programs;185 finally, step five
calls for the compilation of annual reports on due diligence ef-
forts exerted.186
B. Critique of the United Nations and OECD Recommended
Approach
On its face, the U.N. and OECD approach is similar to the
approach adopted by the United States under § 1502. Both call
for transparency in mineral supply chains, essentially to avoid
the purchase of Conflict Minerals. However, the U.N. and
OECD approach does not go as far as requiring companies to
publicize whether they use Conflict Minerals, as is required by
§ 1502. Another key difference is that the U.N. and OECD ap-
proach is not statutory in character, while § 1502 is. Therefore,
an essential problem with the U.N. and OECD approach is that
it is merely voluntary in nature.187 It is simply a recommenda-
tion which has no “teeth” and therefore has limited impact.
Furthermore, the U.N. and OECD approach, like § 1502, only
focuses on the negative, i.e. companies are mandated not to
purchase Conflict Minerals. These approaches inadvertently
triggered a de facto embargo on the DRC and contributed to the
further destruction of its economy.188 None of the approaches
dealing with the Conflict Mineral crisis provides any incentive
for companies to actually purchase conflict-free minerals and to
invest in the DRC.
181. Id.
182. OECDDUEDILIGENCEGUIDANCE, supra note 178, at 72.
183. Id. at 78.
184. Id. at 99.
185. Id. at 106.
186. Id. at 111.
187. Id. at 16.
188. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Seay, supra note 110.
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IV. A NEWAPPROACHUSING TAX CODES TO PROMOTE
WORLD PEACE
As detailed in previous sections, the current approach being
utilized by the United States in its attempt to deal with the
Conflict Mineral crisis is having an undesirable economic im-
pact on the DRC,189 is conceptually flawed,190 and is subject to
U.S. constitutional challenges.191 The approach advanced by
the United Nations and the OECD similarly contributed to the
de facto embargo of the DRC and also lacked any power to
compel companies to comply with their recommendations.
Therefore, this Note proposes an alternative and more dynam-
ic, proactive approach to dealing with the Conflict Minerals cri-
sis in order to help promote peace in the DRC. Unlike the pre-
vious methods advanced, this method focuses on providing in-
dustry with both “carrots” as well as “sticks” when faced with
making purchase decisions of minerals from the DRC.
The proposal entails two steps. First, participating countries
would prohibit any company conducting business in their re-
spective country from purchasing Conflict Minerals. This would
require the establishment of a universally accepted certifica-
tion mechanism verifying that the commodity would in fact be
a bona fide Conflict-Free Mineral.192 Second, world govern-
ments would actively promote the purchase of certified conflict-
free minerals by providing meaningful tax and other economic
incentives for the purchase of conflict-free minerals. This inno-
vative approach would have the direct effect of reducing the
purchase of Conflict Minerals and consequently reducing fund-
ing to the combatants in the DRC. Furthermore, it also would
help stimulate the economic health of the DRC by providing
meaningful tax incentives for businesses around the world to
procure conflict-free minerals from the DRC, rather than from
other countries helping eliminate the de facto embargo current-
ly in effect on the DRC.
189. See supra Part II.B.1.
190. See supra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.4.
191. See supra Part II.B.3.
192. Conflict-Free Minerals are defined as “products that do not contain
minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii).
2015] Implementing Foreign Policy through the Tax Code 983
A. Prohibiting the Purchase of Conflict Minerals and the Adop-
tion of a Certification Mechanism for Conflict-Free Minerals
Under this proposal, governments around the world would be
required to enact legislation prohibiting domestic industry from
purchasing Conflict Minerals from the DRC. In combination
with the prohibition, such statutes would encourage the pur-
chase of Conflict-Free Minerals. A universally accepted certifi-
cation system would be necessary to accomplish this task. To
date, certification systems have been used in other industries,
such as regulating the flow of so-called “blood” diamonds,193 as
well as to measure the environmental impact of certain prod-
ucts.194
For example, diamonds of participating countries are current-
ly certified using the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
a joint industry, government, and civil-society project that cur-
tails the trade of “conflict” or “blood” diamonds, which are
rough diamonds used by rebel movements to fund wars against
lawful governments and human-rights abuses.195 Although the
Kimberly Process has not entirely stopped the violence, it has
made notable achievements in reducing the hostilities.196
A prototype of a conflict-free mineral certification system has
already been put into place. The system, known as the Regional
Certification Mechanism (“RCM”), was developed by Partner-
ship Africa Canada197 to track and certify mineral supply
193. The Kimberley Process, GLOBAL WITNESS,
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-
diamonds/kimberley-process (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) [hereinafter The Kim-
berley Process].
194. For example, the EU Ecolabel is a voluntary labeling scheme that
identifies “products and services that have a reduced environmental impact
throughout their life cycle, from the extraction of raw material through to
production, use and disposal.” EU Ecolabel, EUR. COMMISSION,
ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/information-and-contacts.html (last up-
dated May 19, 2015).
195. Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS,
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds (last visit-
ed Mar. 9, 2015).
196. The Kimberley Process, supra note 193.
197. ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism for Conflict Minerals,
PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., http://www.pacweb.org/en/regional-certification (last
visited Apr. 15, 2015). Partnership Africa Canada is a nonprofit organization
that “undertakes investigative research, advocacy, and policy dialogue on
issues pertaining to conflict, natural resource governance, and human rights
984 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
chains.198 The RCM has been approved by the intergovernmen-
tal organization International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region (“ICGLR”).199 The RCM system consists of four overlap-
ping layers of protection. First, the RCM calls for chain of cus-
tody tracking from mine site to export.200 Second, it calls for the
tracking of the flow of minerals by means of the ICGLR data-
base.201 Third, it calls for regular, independent, third-party au-
dits on all aspects of the mineral supply chain.202 Finally, it
calls for the establishment of an independent, mineral-chain
auditor who is charged with ensuring compliance.203
The United States and other governments should not only
support the certification system approach, but they should also
incorporate it into a new legislation and statutes. This ap-
proach would remove the monitoring burden currently placed
upon individual companies to track the sources of the minerals
in Africa.” PAC’s Work, PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN.,
http://www.pacweb.org/en/about-us/pac-work (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
198. The mechanism was formerly adopted in December 2010 by the Inter-
national Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Int’l Conference on the Great
Lakes Region [ICGLR], Lusaka Declaration on the ICGLR Special Summit to
Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region,
para. 5 (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/47143500.pdf. The
OECD Guidelines were intended to “assist and complement the development
and implementation of comprehensive certification schemes, such as the
[RCM].” See OECD DUEDILIGENCEGUIDANCE, supra note 178, at 15.
199. ICGLR is an intergovernmental organization consisting of countries in
the African Great Lakes Region, namely Angola, Burundi, the Central Afri-
can Republic, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Su-
dan, Tanzania, and Zambia. Background, ICGLR,
http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/background (last visited Jan. 1, 2015). In
November 2006, ICGLR member-countries signed a protocol against the ille-
gal exploitation of natural resources. Pact on Security, Stability,
and Development in the Great Lakes Region art. 9, Dec. 14–15, 2006, 46
I.L.M. 175. To implement the protocol, the ICGLR launched the Regional
Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (“RINR”). Re-
gional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources,
ICGLR, http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/natural-resources (last visited Jan.
1, 2015).
200. Briefing Note on the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism,
PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN. 3 (June 2012),
http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/icglr/PAC_Briefing_Note_on_the_ICGLR_
Regional_Certification_Mechanism_June_2012.pdf.
201. Id. at 5.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 6.
2015] Implementing Foreign Policy through the Tax Code 985
they use in their businesses. Having a governmentally-
approved organization certifying the bona fides of conflict-free
minerals would simplify the process and remove any doubts as
to whether a company’s purchase may have violated the pro-
posed Conflict Minerals statute. This approach would also have
cost-saving benefits to individual companies, as the majority of
the expenses would be assumed by the certification system it-
self.204
B. Incentivizing the Purchase of Conflict-Free Minerals
In order to promote the purchase of conflict-free minerals, the
United States and other countries must take initiative and of-
fer incentives in the form of tax benefits or other economic in-
centives to companies that purchase certified conflict-free min-
erals. Although such a concept may not have been deemed ap-
propriate in the United States just a few years ago,205 over the
last thirty years, U.S. Congress has transformed the Tax
Code206 from being solely a revenue raising instrument into a
vehicle used to implement government policy and social re-
form.207 Since 1986, Congress has amended the Tax Code to
give taxpayers money for doing what it perceived to be the
right thing in the form of exclusions from income, deductions
from income, nonrefundable credits against tax liability, or re-
fundable credits against tax liability.208 For example, the
Earned Income Tax Credit has become the federal govern-
ment’s greatest anti-poverty undertaking.209 Furthermore,
many new social initiatives have since been enacted by Con-
204. It should be noted that in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., one of the plaintiffs’ ar-
guments concerned the high costs associated with implementation of § 1502.
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2013). Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that “the Commission arbi-
trarily underestimated some aspects of the Rule’s costs.” Id. at 59–61.
205. The United States Constitution grants Congress “the power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Until recently,
tax scholarship permitted use of the tax code for activity that predominantly
raised revenue, not activity that primarily regulated or promoted social poli-
cy. Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural
Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 68 (2013).
206. 26 U.S.C. (1986).
207. Tahk, supra note 205, at 71–74.
208. Id. at 69–71.
209. Id. at 70.
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gress that involve providing credits and refunds to taxpayers
for doing what Congress believes to be the right thing, such as
the empowerment-zone credits,210 child-care credits,211 the first-
time homebuyer credit,212 and the personal and dependency
exemptions.213 This new attitude toward the Tax Code has also
recently been apparent in the Affordable Care Act of 2010.214
Therefore, it is undoubtedly appropriate to use the Tax Code as
a tool to implement the United States’ foreign policy of combat-
ing terrorism, as well as the promotion of peace and the protec-
tion of the human rights of the people of the DRC.
Furthermore, the use of tax incentives as a vehicle to engi-
neer social change was promoted by the United Nations Coun-
cil on Human Rights in its adoption of the Guidelines on Ex-
treme Poverty and Human Rights (“GEPHR”).215 The GEPHR
states in detail that:
States must take deliberate, specific and targeted steps, indi-
vidually and jointly, to create an international enabling envi-
ronment conducive to poverty reduction, including in matters
relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, taxa-
tion, finance, environmental protection and development co-
operation. This includes cooperating to mobilize the maxi-
mum of available resources for the universal fulfillment of
human rights. 216
210. See 26 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
211. See 26 U.S.C. § 21 (2006); see also 26 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (amended
2015).
212. See 26 U.S.C. § 36 (2010).
213. See 26 U.S.C. 151(b)–(c) (2006).
214. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111–148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.). Tahk explains this new concept:
The Affordable Care Act marks the latest and most significant step
in this structural transformation. Four tax provisions—the premium
assistance credit, the small business credit, the individual mandate
and the employer mandate—are the primary planks of the health
care reform package. All of these take the form of tax code sections
and the IRS is responsible for administering them.
Tahk, supra note 205, at 71.
215. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Final
Draft of the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/21/39 (Jul. 18, 2012).
216. Id. ¶ 96.
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The GEPHR’s call for the use of tax policy, among other
methods, to reduce poverty and promote human rights signifies
the world’s endorsement of using tax policy to facilitate world
peace.217
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the drafters of the current initiatives to reduce
conflict in the DRC had noble intentions when formulating
their strategies. However, not only have such initiatives proven
to be insufficient in achieving their goal of ameliorating the
humanitarian crisis in the DRC, they are actually contributing
to it. Therefore, a different strategy must be adopted.
A new approach that would encourage doing good by utilizing
tax codes of countries around the world to help those suffering
in the DRC would foster multiple benefits. The obvious benefit
is that there would be a reduction of the sale of Conflict Miner-
als, thereby reducing funding of rebel activity. At the same
time, this new strategy would help eliminate the current de
facto embargo on DRC-sourced minerals, keeping conflict-free
mines open and stimulating the economy of the DRC. Addi-
tionally, in adopting this proposal, governing bodies would be
enacting a robust statute that would specifically prohibit the
purchase of Conflict Minerals by companies doing business in
such a country. This would remedy the voluntary nature of the
U.N.’s and the OECD’s recommendations, as well as eliminate
the constitutional and enforcement ambiguities surrounding
§ 1502.
Since our society is benefitting daily from products that con-
tain Conflict Minerals, this is not just a Congolese or African
issue, but rather a global issue, warranting a global response.
Therefore, all beneficiaries must address such atrocities by
amending legislation to more effectively combat it. Members of
the global community must act now. Across the world, count-
less lives are needlessly lost to the violence and corruption fos-
tered by the purchase and dealings in Conflict Minerals every
day that we wait. If beneficiaries address such atrocities
through amending current legislation and forcing companies to
act as proposed in this Note, untold lives can be saved . . . and
217. See id.
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